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NOTES
Constitutional Law: Ethics Commission v. Keating:

The Oklahoma Supreme Court Defies the Constitutional
Mandate of the People and Clips the Commission's

Wings
L Introduction
"A majority held in restraint by constitutional checks and limitations .. is the
only true sovereign of a free people."' Abraham Lincoln spoke these words in his
first inaugural address. Checks and limitations placed upon our government and its
officials remain vitally important in today's politically charged democracy. The
current political climate fosters a mentality among our elected leaders that they must
exercise all available avenues of power to maintain their positions.
The State of Oklahoma has witnessed no shortage of abuses by elected officials
in modern history Many can recall the embarrassment of Okscam, a federal
investigation that exposed political corruption among county commissioners and
resulted in 220 felony convictions in more than sixty of the state's seventy-seven
counties.3 In addition, the records of former Governors David Hall and David
Walters4 demonstrate a poor sense of ethics in regard to Oklahoma's elected
officials. Many national tragedies such as Watergate and the impeachment of
President William Clinton indicate that the ethical void is present on the national
level as well as the state level. Indeed, a review of modem history reveals a number
of examples such as Teapot Dome, Iran-Contra, the Keating Five, Filegate, and
Travelgate, and the list goes on and on. One can quickly see why Americans have
grown weary of the ethical character of their government officials.
In 1990, Oklahoma voters set into motion a process designed to positively
influence the ethical character of the state's government and its officials. The
citizens chose to add a new article to the Oklahoma Constitution by way of
initiative petition and state question. In Oklahoma, initiative petition is a method by

I. Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), in LETTERS AND ADDRESSES OF
ABRAHAM LINCOLN 195 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1946).
2. See David Dary, A Work in Progress: The Oklahoma PublishingCompany Celebrates 95 Years,
DAILY OKLAHOMAN (Oklahoma City), Nov. 8, 1998, at 1.

3. See id.; see also Ken Neal, Kickback Scandals: Could it Happen Again?, TULSA WORLD,July
19, 1998, at G6 (providing background details of county commissioner scandal).
4. Gov. David Hall was convicted of bribery and extortion, and Gov. David Walters pled guilty to
a campaign finance law violation. See Walters v. Oklahoma Ethics Comm'n, 746 P.2d 172 (Okla. 1987).
See generally Wayne Greene, Sooner State Is Not a Strangerto Impeachment: Two Governors Have
Been OustedfromStatehouse, TULSA WORLD, Dec. 20, 1998, at A8 (discussing two Oklahoma governors
removed from office in 1920s).
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which the people act independently of the legislature in an effort to enact
legislation It is perhaps the purest example of democracy in the sense that it
represents legislation directly by the people instead of through representation.
Newly created article 29 of the Oklahoma Constitution imposed a constitutional
check or limitation in the form of a new Ethics Commission charged with the duty
of promulgating and administering rules regarding the ethical conduct of state
officers and employees The constitutional addition set forth an Ethics Commission
designed to act independently of the legislative and executive branches in an effort
to eliminate the abuses found in our state government.
In 1998, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that an Ethics Commission rule that
barred the use of public funds or property for partisan political purposes did not
apply to the Governor and his use of state transportation to attend partisan political
rallies In this action, Ethics Commission v. Keating, the court refused to enforce
a clearly worded rule on the grounds that it conflicted with a legislative statute.8
As a result, Keating calls into question the authoritative boundaries among the
courts, the Governor, the Oklahoma Legislature, and the Ethics Commission.
Furthermore, Keating substantially weakens the expressed power and authority of
the Ethics Commission and threatens to subvert the clear intent of article 29.
This note examines Keating and analyzes the Oklahoma Supreme Court's error

in this decision. Part MI.A of this note explores precedent concerning the Ethics
Commission and its authority to promulgate rules. Part ll.B analyzes precedent

concerning the primary issue in Keating, the use of public funds for political
partisan activity. Part I provides an in-depth look into Keating, including the
court's findings and reasoning. Part V.A compares and contrasts Keating with prior
case law on point and offers a simple solution to the specific controversy involved
in Keating. Finally, Part V.B predicts the impact of Keating on the future ability
of the Ethics Commission to police the ethical conduct of our elected state officials.
I. The Law Prior to Keating
A. The Oklahoma Ethics Commission

The Oklahoma Ethics Commission is a modified version of two former ethics
committees. The Commission embodies a movement that began in the mid-1980s
in the State of Oklahoma. After repeated scandals, the Oklahoma Legislature passed
the Oklahoma Ethics Commission Ace in 1986. In 1989, the Oklahoma Legislature
amended and replaced the Oklahoma Ethics Commission Act with the Oklahoma
Campaign Compliance and Ethical Standards Act. Both acts provided for an
Ethics Commission that would investigate and expose ethical violations by state
5. See OKLA. CONST. art. V, §§ 1-8; see also Hughes v. Bryan, 425 P.2d 952, 952, 954 (Okla.
1967).

6. See OKLA. CONST. art. XXIX, § 3.
7. See Ethics Commn v. Keating, 958 P.2d 1250, 1257 (Okla. 1998).

8. See id at 1255.
9. 74 OKLA. STAT. §§ 4200-4284.1 (Supp. 1986).
10. 74 OKLA. STAT. § 4200 (Supp. 1989).
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officials. Both acts restricted the activity of political parties and organizations.
Many perceived the statutorily created ethics committee to be underfunded and

structurally ineffective." Thus, by 1990 the people of Oklahoma began to search
for even greater control over the ethical conduct of our elected officials. By way

of initiative petition, Oklahoma voters brought forth a state question12 to approve

the addition of a constitutional amendment that would create a more powerful,

constitutionally mandated, Ethics Commission. In 1990, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court ruled upon the legitimacy of the proposed ballot, State Question No. 627, in
In re Initiative Petition No. 341, State Question No. 627." The court upheld the

legality of the proposed amendment" and noted several key points regarding the
language of the amendment.
The court held that the petition did "not give the Commission unfettered
discretion" as an independent rule-making body." In fact, the court found the
Commission's rule-making procedures to be similar to those contained in the
Administrative Procedures Act. 6 The In re Petition No. 341 court detailed the
numerous restrictions placed upon the Commission's authority. 7 Specifically, the
Commission may author "rules only after holding a public hearing."18 After a rule
is promulgated, the Oklahoma Legislature can reject the rule by a joint resolution. 9
The Governor may also veto the legislative joint resolution.' Even after the
adoption of a rule, the Oklahoma Legislature can still repeal or modify the rule.2'

Consequently, "any rule promulgated by the Commission would not become

11. See generally Oklahoma Constitution Revision Study Comm'n, The Constitutionof the State of
Oklahoma: Recommendationsfor Revision, 16 OKLA. CrrY U. L REv. 515, 657-68 (1991) (drafting
history and intent of new article 29 of the Oklahoma Constitution).
12. Initiative Petition No. 341, State Question No. 627.
13. 796 P.2d 267 (Okla. 1990).
14. See iL at 274. The proposed ballot read as follows:
This measure would add a new article XXIX to the State Constitution. It would create
a five member Ethics Commission. The Governor would appoint one member. The Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court would appoint one member. The Attorney General would
appoint one member. The President Pro Tempore of the Senate would appoint one
member. Also, the Speaker of the House would appoint one member. No two members
could be from the same congressional district. No more than three persons from one
political party could be members at the same time. The members could make rules for
campaign ethics. The rules could be disapproved by the House and Senate. The Governor
could veto the disapproval. The House and Senate could enact ethics laws. The
Conunission would be required to investigate violations and could prosecute in District
Court.
Id.
15. Id. at 270.
16. See id. at 270 n.18. The Administrative Procedures Act is found under 75 OKLA. STAT. §§ 302303 (Supp. 1999).
17. See In re Petition No. 341, 796 P.2d at 270.
18. Id
19. See id.
20. See id,
21. See id.
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effective without legislative ratification."' In fact, after the rules are put through
legislative review, they are published as a part of the Oklahoma Statutes.
The court also reinforced the position that the Commission fulfilled a legitimate
state interest. The court cited from the Oklahoma Attorney General's brief, which
stated the basis for establishing the Commission:
[The] Iran-Contra and County Commissioner scandals all remind us that
not all public officials live up to their duty as public trustee. Indeed
nearly [sic] a month goes by without news of a prominent public
official being charged, indicted or convicted. To guard against such
scandals, avoid conflict of interest, over reaching, and similar problems,
many Oklahomans are looking to an administrative solution, such as the
Ethics Commission ....
Furthermore, the In re Petition No. 341 court noted that the Oklahoma
Campaigning Compliance and Ethical Standards Acte confirmed the state's
legitimate interest in establishing a commission.' The Act puts forth the objective
that government should be conducted in such a way that public officials are
independent and impartial and that the office is not used for private gain. Also,
the campaign process should operate to ensure that the people of this state elect
their government in an informed and "equitable manner.""
In a concurring opinion to In re PetitionNo. 341, Justice Wilson summarized the
intent of the amendment. She wrote that the gist of the matter is that the Ethics
Commission would "have legislative power to adopt rules; police power to enforce
the rules; and adjudicatory power to determine and impose penalties for violation
of the rules."' Such legislative, executive, and judicial powers would apply to any
person who serves as a state officer or employee."
Oklahoma voters approved the article 29 constitutional ballot and a new era of
ethical accountability dawned. However, the powers of the newly formed Ethics
Commission were soon tested in Ethics Commission v. Cullison20 Cullison hinged
upon the appropriate constitutional division of power between the Ethics Commission and the Oklahoma Legislature in regard to establishing ethical standards of
conduct for state officials and employees."'
Cullison came about as a result of the Ethics Commission's actions shortly after
its inception in 1991. The Commission fulfilled its constitutionally required duty
and created rules concerning the ethical conduct of state officials and employees?2
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id. (emphasis added).
I1. at 272.
74 OKLA. STAT. §§ 4200-4248.1 (Supp. 1995).
In re Petition No. 341, 794 P. 2d at 272.
74 OKIA. STAT. § 4201(1).

27. IU.§ 4201(3).
28. In re Petition No. 341, 796 P.2d at 275 (Wilson, J., concurring).
29. See id.

30. 850 P.2d 1069 (Okla. 1993).
31. See id at 1074.

32. The people of Oklahoma voted to adopt the constitutional amendment that created the Ethics
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However, pursuant to the Oklahoma Legislature's authority under the constitutional
amendment that created the Commission, the Oklahoma Legislature disapproved all
of the Commission's rules in the 1992 legislative session. Instead, the legislature
soon passed comprehensive statutory provisions concerning the same subject matter
as existed in the disapproved Ethics Commission's rules?' Consequently, in
Cullison the Commission challenged the Oklahoma Legislature's authority to act in
such a manner. The Commission alleged that the legislature "usurped the function
of the Commission by unilaterally creating the Legislature's own" statutory version
of the Commission rules' Numerous nonpartisan watchdog organizations appeared
amici curiae in support of the Ethics Commission's position, including Common
Cause of Oklahoma, League of Women Voters, Consumer Watch Committee of
Oklahoma, Inc., and Oklahomans for Integrity in Government."
The Oklahoma Supreme Court determined in Cullison that the constitutional
power to create, modify, and repeal "Ethics Commission rules is shared between the
Ethics Commission and the Oklahoma Legislature."' However, the court held that
the legislature cannot replace the rules set forth by the Ethics Commission with a
comprehensive statutory plan seeking to regulate the ethical standards of state
officials and employees.37 The court found that "the obvious meaning" of the
constitutional amendment that created the Ethics Commission is that the people of
Oklahoma intend for the ethical conduct of state officials to be regulated by rules
promulgated by the Ethics Commission?' The Cullison court noted that one
constitutionally created branch or body of government cannot exercise a function
that is expressly delegated to another branch 9 Consequently, the legislature cannot
regulate the ethical conduct of state officials by legislative statutes that completely
The court defined the
disregard the Commission's rule-making authority.
legislature's authority as the ability to disapprove proposed Ethics Commission rules,
modify or repeal the rules, provide criminal penalties for conduct, determine
conditions of employment, regulate local political officers, and regulate conduct of
legislative members.4 '
In a concurring opinion in Cullison, Justice Wilson further illuminated the
distribution of power as it pertains to the regulation of ethical conduct. Justice
Wilson explained that article 29, which created the Ethics Commission, must be
read as a prohibition on the Oklahoma Legislature's power to confine, restrict, limit,

Commission in September 1990. In 1991, the Commission promulgated its first set of rules that became
the point of controversy in Cullison. The legislature disapproved the rules in its 1992 session.
33. The statutory legislative rules were codified in the 1992 Oklahoma Statutes. See 74 OKLA. STAT.
§§ 2-44 (Supp. 1992).
34. Cullison, 850 P.2d at 1071.
35. See iULat 1072.

36. Id at 1075-76.
37. See id at 1075.
38. See id.
at 1076.

39. See id.
40. See id
41. See id.
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or otherwise infringe upon the rule-making powers of the Commission.42 Article
29 provided the Commission with the primary rule-making authority to determine,
define, and delineate ethical conduct for state officers and state employees."
Therefore, the legislature's power to develop ethical policy is now secondary and
second in order of time to that of the Ethics Commission." Contrary to precedent,
the distribution of policy-making power in article 29 overturns the well-settled
principle that the legislature may delegate to state agencies the power to make rules
of a subordinate character and implement policy created by the legislature.45
Indeed, article 29 creates an Ethics Commission that is quite powerful as
compared to other ethics commissions found throughout the country." Most states
that have constitutionally created ethics commissions give the legislative body the
duty to enact substantive ethics legislation. '7 Only Rhode Island may claim to have
a more authoritative ethics commission than does Oklahoma." For example, Rhode
Island's Ethics Commission enjoys complete and unabridged authority to draft its
own code of ethics, and the rules are not subject to approval or rejection by the
legislature as they are in Oklahoma 9 With the exception of that distinction, the
Rhode Island Ethics Commission and the Oklahoma Ethics Commission are quite
similar. Both bodies are given the authority to write rules of ethical conduct and the
power to enforce them.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court has been careful to protect the independence
of the Commission. In In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor (Ethics Commission)," the court held that the ethics amendment merely shifted the legislative
power concerning ethics away from the Rhode Island legislative body." However,
the General Assembly retained the right to establish ethics laws that are not in
conflict with those enacted by the Commission.' The Commission's power is not
limitless in the area of ethics.' The Commission could not set standards that
seriously hamper the executive or legislative branches' ability to perform usual and
ordinary duties, such as the appointment of officials to office.'
Other states tend to have ethics commissions that are less independent because
their commissions merely implement the ethical guidelines as set forth by the state's

42. See id. at 1085.

43. See id
44. See id. at 1085 n.4.
45. See id
46. See Samuel D. Zurier, Rhode Island's Ethics Laws: Constitutionaland PolicyIssues, R.I. BJ.,
June 1996, at 9, 55 n.4.
47. See id
48. See R.I. CONsT. art. IIH, § 8.
49. See id Of course, the rules are subject to judicial review to verify constitutional validity, as are

the rules set forth by the Ethics Commission in Oklahoma.
50. See generallyIn re Advisory Opinion to the Governor (Ethics Comm'n), 612 A.2d I (R.I. 1992)
(discussing in detail Rhode Island's Ethic Commission and its constitutional authority).
51. See i. at 19.

52. See id
53. See id
54. See id
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legislative body. In Florida, the legislature passed a Code of Ethics for public
officers and employees of the state' Florida's Commission on Ethics is merely
given the duty to receive and investigate sworn complaints concerning possible
violations of the Code of Ethics as established by the legislature. In Hawaii, the
state constitution requires the legislature and each political subdivision to adopt a
code of ethics that will apply to elected officers and employees of the respective
legislature or political subdivisions.' Thereafter, separate and impartial ethics
commissions administer each code of ethics." In Montana, the legislature is
similarly charged with the duty of creating a code of ethics that prohibits conflict
between public duty and private interest for legislative members, state officials, and
state employees."
The differences between the few states that have created constitutionally anchored
ethics commissions are notable. The majority of states with ethics commissions
have commissions that administer the ethical standards as set forth by the legislative
branch. However, Rhode Island and Oklahoma have placed the power to establish
ethical standards within the realm of the ethics commission. Such an arrangement
denotes an attempt to isolate the powers of the respective ethics commissions from
the influences of the politically charged legislature.
B. Public Funds used for PartisanPoliticalActivity
The specific point of controversy in Keating, and the focus of the Ethics
Commission Rule 257, 10-1-3, involved the Governor's use of state transportation
to attend partisan political activities.' The Ethics Commission charged that the
Governor's activities violated not only the Commission's rule, but also the state
constitution because they involved the use of public funds for partisan political
purposes." The point is certainly not without a track record, as prior law
demonstrates.
The Oklahoma Constitution addresses the issue in several passages. Article 10,
section 14 provides that taxes shall be collected for public purposes only.62 Article
10, section 15 provides that the state cannot make a donation by gift or otherwise
to any company, association, or corporation.! Article 10, section 17 provides that

55. See FLA. STAT. ch. 112.313 (1998) (establishing standards of conduct for Florida's public
officers and employees of agencies).
56. See State Comm'n on Ethics v. Sullivan, 430 So. 2d 928, 934 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
57. See HAw. CONsT. art. XIV.

58. See id.
59. See MoNT. CONST. art. XIII, § 4.
60. See Ethics Comm'n v. Keating, 958 P.2d 1250, 1252 (Okla. 1998).

61. See i.at 1262.
62. See OKIA. CONST. art. X, § 14 ("Taxes shall be levied and collected by general laws, and for

public purposes only .. ").
63. See OKLA. CONST. art. X,§ 15(A). The section provides:
Except as provided by this section, the credit of the State shall not be given, pledged, or

loaned to any individual, company, corporation, or association, municipality, or political
subdivision of the State, nor shall the State become an owner or stockholder in, nor make
donation by gift, subscription to stock, by tax, or otherwise, to any company, association,
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the Oklahoma Legislature cannot appropriate any money to any corporation,
association, or individual." Article 10, section 19 provides that every act enacted
by the legislature that levies a tax shall distinctly specify the purpose of the tax and
the purpose shall not be changed.' The message put forth by the various sections
of article 10 is that public money is not to be arbitrarily used for the purposes of
any private association. However, the provisions do not specifically address political
activity by an officer of the state.
Oklahoma authority is sparse in this area; however, other states have spoken on
the issue. In Stanson v. Mott,' the California Supreme Court held that the director
of the parks department lacked the necessary authority to expend public funds to
promote the virtues of a bond issue.' In Stanson, the Department of Parks and
Recreation had spent thousands of dollars in public funds to promote the passage
of a facilities bond act. The Department had produced written materials that were
not merely informative, but rather were promotional and openly supported the bond
proposal.' The Department also expended state funds on a three person staff,
speaking engagements, and travel expenses all in an effort to promote the passage
of the bond issue.'
In Stanson, the court began its analysis with the principle that expenditures by an
administrative official are proper only when they are authorized by a legislative
enactment The court emphasized that executive officials are not free to choose
to spend public funds for any purpose, even if a public one.7!' Instead, they are
bound to utilize the funds in accordance with the legislative purpose as it is
specified.'
The Stanson court also determined that the public funds entrusted to the board
belonged equally to the proponents and the opponents of the bond issue.' Furthermore, the court's research demonstrated that every court that had addressed the issue

or corporation.
Id.
64. See OKLA. CONST. art. X, § 17. The section reads: "The Legislature shall not authorize any

county or subdivision thereof, city, town, or incorporated district, to become a stockholder in any
company, association, or corporation, or to obtain or appropriate money for, or levy any tax for, or to

loan its credit to any corporation, association, or individual." Id.
65. See OKLA. CONST. art. X,§ 19.
Every act enacted by the Legislature, and every ordinance and resolution passed by any

county, city, town, or municipal board or local legislative body, levying a tax shall specify
distinctly the purpose for which said tax is levied, and no tax levied and collected for one
purpose shall ever be devoted to another purpose.

Il
66. 551 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1976).

67. See i. at 16.
68. See id. at 4.
69. See i.
70. See i. at 6.

71. See id
72. See id.
73. See id. at 8.
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had found the use of public funds for partisan political activity to be improper.74
Specifically, the court found:
A fundamental precept of this nation's democratic electoral process is
that the government may not 'take sides' in election contests or bestow
an unfair advantage on one of several competing factions . . .A
principal danger feared by our country's founders lay in the possibility
that the holders of government authority would use official power
improperly to perpetuate themselves, or their allies, in office.'
The court cited Thomas Jefferson's statement that "[t]o compel a man to furnish
contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves, is
sinful and tyrannical."'76 The selective use of public funds for partisan election
campaigns invokes just such an inappropriate distortion of the democratic electoral
process.'
The Stanson court also reiterated that the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution disallows the government to make public facilities available only to
particular political factions." The court found that once a public forum is opened,
equal access must be given to all of the separate competing factions.79
Additional authorities have questioned the validity of using public funds to the
advantage of one partisan group. In Anderson v. City of Bostont' the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts expounded that "[s]urely, the Constitution of the
United States does not authorize the expenditure of public funds to promote the
reelection of... State and local officials [to the exclusion of their opponents]."'"
Government domination of the medium of ideas and political self-perpetuation is
repugnant to a system of a constitutional and republican government.' In Schulz
v. State,' the New York Court of Appeals held that a state agency may conduct
election activities and disseminate literature to educate, inform, advocate, or promote
voting, so long as such activities did not intend to persuade either side of the
issue."

74. See id. The court cites several cases in support of its statement. See generally Elsenau v. City
of Chicago, 165 N.E. 129, 130-31 (Il1.1929); Stem v. Kramarsky, 375 N.Y.S.2d 235,239-40 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1975); Porter v. Tiffany, 502 P.2d 1385, 1387-89 (Or. Ct. App. 1972); State v. Superior Court, 160

P. 755, 756 (Wash. 1917).
75. Stanson, 551 P.2d at 9.

76.
77.
78.
79.

I.
See id.
See id. at 10.
See id.

80. 380 N.E.2d 628 (Mass. 1978).

81. Id. at 637 n.14.
82. See id.
83. 654 N.E.2d 1226 (N.Y. 1995).

84. See id See generally James A. Gardner, The Uses and Abuses of Incumbency: People v.
Ohrensteinand the Limits ofInherentLegislative Power,60 FORDHAm L. REV. 217 (1991) (finding when

government uses powers to improve or obstruct fortunes of particular candidates, it deprives people of
free choice among candidates that belongs to people alone).
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III. Ethics Commission v. Keating

A. Background

In Keating, the Ethics Commission claimed that Oklahoma Governor Frank
Keating violated the Commission's Rule 257, 10-1-3(a), which states:
A person shall not use or authorize the use of public funds, property, or
time, to participate or assist in the organization of or preparation for a
fundraiser for a campaign or in any solicitation of funds for or against
a candidate for state office or a ballot measure.'
The Governor allegedly violated the rule by using state owned and operated
vehicles and aircraft to attend meetings held for the purpose of raising funds for
entities with political party affiliations.' The Governor also used the transportation
to attend meetings to raise funds for individuals campaigning for various public
offices." Five instances involved fundraisers for political committees for the
Republican Party.' Twenty-nine instances involved fundraisers for individuals
seeking public office.'
The Governor claimed that he was authorized to use state-owned vehicles to
attend such functions by way of title 47, section 2-101(b) of the Oklahoma
Statutes.' The Governor argued that the statute mandated the Oklahoma
Department of Public Safety (DPS) to provide him with transportation: "The
Commissioner of Public Safety shall provide personal security and protection,
transportation, and communications capabilities for the Governor, the Governor's
immediate family, and the Lieutenant Governor."'" The Governor contended that
the statute controlled over the Ethics Commission rule, and thus allowed him to use
state provided transportation to attend partisan political rallies'
B. Issues Presented

Two issues form the heart of the decision in Keating. The first is whether an
Ethics Commission rule controls when a legislative statute purportedly conflicts with
the rule. The second is whether the Governor's use of state owned and operated
transportation to attend partisan political rallies is unconstitutional because it utilizes
public funds for a private political purpose.

85. 74 OKLA. STAT. § 62 (Supp. 1995).
86. Ethics Comm'n v. Keating, 958 P.2d 1250, 1254 (Okla. 1998).
87. See id at 1255.

88. See id
89.
90.
91.
92.

See
See
See
See

id
id at 1254-55.
id (citing 47 OKLA. STAT. § 2-101(b) (Supp. 1992)).
id at 1255.
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C. The Court'sDecision and Reasoning
In Keating, the court first examined the language of the Ethics Commission Rule
257, 10-1-3 and compared it to the language of the statute that authorizes the DPS
to provide the Governor with transportation. The court recognized that the
Commission's rule applies on its face when the Governor is transported to a
fundraiser.n' Specifically, the court agreed that the vehicles were state property and
that they were used to directly assist the Governor in participating in the political
fundraisers.' However, the court noted that the rule has an exception, contained
in a subsection, which states that the rule does not apply to "activities that are a part
of the ordinary conduct of the governmental entity."95 The court determined that
the DPS could be deemed a governmental entity as provided under the rule's
exception.' Consequently, the court found the controlling issue to be whether the
Governor's use of DPS transportation to partisan political rallies is a part of the
ordinary conduct of the DPS. 9
Upon close examination of the statute that provides DPS transportation to the
Governor, the Keating court found no express limitations on such use.' Furthermore, the court cited authority to suggest that the legislature's lack of express
limitations upon the Governor's use of DPS transportation may imply that the
legislature intended for there to be no limitations.O Therefore, the court found that
the statute's language and the legislature's discernable intent placed no limitations
upon the Governor's use of DPS transportation to attend political rallies." °
Accordingly, the court concluded that the DPS-provided transportation to partisan
political events is an activity that constitutes ordinary conduct of the DPS. 0'
The suggested conflict between the Ethics Commission's rule and title 47, section
2-101(b) of the Oklahoma Statutes moved the Keating court to discuss the power
and authority of the Ethics Commission. The Governor alleged that provisions
concerning the Governor are within the lawmaking power of the Oklahoma
Legislature and not the rule-making power of the Commission."~ Based upon
article 29, section 3 of the Oklahoma Constitution, the Commission is empowered
Due to the
to promulgate rules of ethical conduct for state officials."
"constitutional underpinning" of the rules, the court determined that the rules "have

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

See id.
See id.
Id.
See id. at 1256.
See id
See id.

99. See id; see also City of Duncan v. Bingham, 394 P.2d 456, 459-60 (Okla. 1964) (explaining

that legislative silence, when it has authority to speak, may be considered an implication of legislative
intent).
100.
101.
102.
103.

See Keating, 958 P.2d at 1257.
See i,
See id at 1259.
See id.
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no less weight than statutes."" Furthermore, the rules are subject to rejection by
the legislature and veto by the Governor." However, the court also found that the
Commission cannot usurp the legislature's powers on issues over which the
Commission has no constitutional authority." The court determined that the
statute providing transportation to the Governor fulfilled a security purpose over
which the Commission had no authority."n Therefore, the court held that the
statute trumps the rule and renders it ineffective in terms of the Governor's use of
DPS transportation for partisan political events."'
After reaching the conclusion that the Governor had statutory authority to use
DPS transportation to attend political rallies, the Keating court turned to a
constitutional analysis. The Oklahoma Constitution contains several provisions to
limit the expenditure of public funds to activities that are for a public purpose."
The Commission argued that the Governor did not fulfill any public purpose by
attending political fundraisers."' However, the court took a different approach and
likened the Governor's use of DPS-provided transportation to that of a law
enforcement officer taking his patrol car home at night."' The officers do not
travel to their residences to fulfill any official duty. However, the court noted that
an officer does respond to emergencies from his residence, and the availability of
immediate transportation fulfills the requisite public purpose."' Specifically, the
public receives a benefit by providing the officers with the ability to respond
quickly to emergencies."' The court determined that the same benefit applies to
the Governor's use of DPS transportation by providing him with the ability to
respond to emergencies and perform the duties of Governor regardless of his
location." 4 Therefore, the court concluded that the Governor's use of DPS
transportation did not violate the Oklahoma Constitution in terms of using public
funds for a private purpose."'

104. Id
105. See id
106. See id.
107. See id. at 1261.
108. See id.

109. See id.
at 1257. The court referenced three sections of the Oklahoma Constitution, which state
in pertinent part as follows:
(1) "Taxes shall be levied and collected by general laws, and for public purposes only .... OKLA.
CONST. art. X, § 14.
(2) "The Legislature shall not authorize any county or subdivision thereof, city, town, or incorporated
district, . . .to obtain or appropriate money for, or levy any tax for, or to loan its credit to any
corporation, association, or individual." OKLA. CONST. art. X, § 17.
(3) "Every act enacted by the Legislature, .. . levying a tax shall specify distinctly the purpose for
which said tax is levied, and no tax levied and collected for one purpose shall ever be devoted to another
purpose." OKLA. CONST. art X, § 19.
110. See Keating, 958 P.2d at 1257.
11I.See id.at 1258.
112. See id

113. See id.
114. See id
115. See id at 1259.
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V. Analysis of the Keating Decision
A. Usurping the Ethics Commission's Authority
The Oklahoma Supreme Court's decision in Keating demonstrates a profound
error in light of precedent and the constitutional intent of the people of Oklahoma.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has backpedaled from its prior decisions concerning
the newly formed Ethics Commission. In fact, the court directly contradicts its prior
findings concerning the authority of the Ethics Commission.
Ethics Commission Rule 257, 10-1-3 became binding upon all officers of the state
government by way of methods that are distinctly set forth by the Oklahoma
constitutional amendment that created the Commission."' Neither the Commission
nor the legislature deviated from the expressed path designed to implement new
ethics rules.
In Keating, the court relied heavily upon the fact that the statute authorizing DPS
transportation for the Governor includes no limitations upon the use of such
transportation." 7 The court determined that the absence of express statutory
limitations is indicative of legislative intent that there should be no limitations on
DPS-provided transportation."' However, the court failed to reconcile its logic
with the fact that the Ethics Commission presented Rule 257, 10-1-3 to the
legislature for approval or rejection after the passage of the statute authorizing DPS
transportation. The legislature took no action to reject the rule. Therefore, by the
same logic that the Supreme Court used to demonstrate legislative intent for the lack
of limitations on the DPS transportation, the court must also find a legislative intent
for the ethics rule to be valid and authoritative for all subjects under its control.
The legislature passed the statute authorizing DPS transportation for the Governor
in 1961 and has not modified it since 1986. The Ethics Commission implemented
its rule banning the use of state property and funds for partisan political purposes
in 1994. The Commission has presented the rule to the Oklahoma Legislature in
1994, 1995, 1996, and 1997.9 On each occasion, as provided by article 29 of the
Oklahoma Constitution, the legislature had the opportunity and authority to
disapprove, repeal, or modify the rule. On each of the four occasions, the legislature
did not exercise its authority and let the rule stand without modification. Surely the
legislature's lack of action in regard to the rule satisfies the Supreme Court's
persuasive test of legislative intent for the rule to be valid and enforceable.
In fact, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has previously supported the same
conclusion. The In re Petition No. 341 decision determined that "any rule
promulgated by the Commission would not become effective without legislative
ratification" because the legislature maintains the ability to repeal or modify the
Commission's rules." Therefore, in Keating, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
116. See OKLA. CoNsT. art. XXIX, § 3.
117. See Keating, 958 P.2d at 1256.
118. See id

119. See id. at 1268 n.17 (Opala, J., dissenting).
120. In re Initiative Petition No. 341, State Question No. 627, 796 P.2d 267, 270 (Okla. 1990)
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directly contradicted itself by finding that the legislature did not intend for the rule
to be effective upon the Governor's use of transportation to partisan political events.
The constitutional amendment that allows for the Ethics Commission and its rulemaking ability also provides the Governor with the power to veto any rule put forth

by the Commission. The Governor did not exercise his option in the case of Rule
257, 10-1-3. Perhaps by the court's same logic of "intent," one could equally
determine that the Governor himself intended that the rule be valid and enforceable.
The Keating court simply interpreted the legislative statute providing transportation for the Governor too broadly. Under the canons of statutory interpretation,
2
the court should determine the plain and unambiguous intent of the statute.' 1
Certainly, the plain meaning of the statute is to provide the Governor and others

with state provided transportation. However, it also is apparent that the plain
meaning of the statute is to direct the actions of the "Commissioner of Public
Safety" and not the actions of the Governor, particularly in regard to ethics." A
fundamental canon of interpretation is that a statute cannot go beyond its text."
Yet, the Keating court seems to suggest that the statute's blanket authorization of
state owned transportation for the Governor's ordinary use impliedly excludes the
application of any limitations."u In Public Service Co. v. State Corp. Commis-

sion," the court found that the mention of one thing in a statute does not
impliedly exclude another thing when such an interpretation is used to override a
different legislative intent." Statutory directives to the Commissioner of Public
Safety and ethical limitations on the Governor should constitute different areas of
legislative intent. Therefore, the court should not so readily discard the possibility
of ethical restraints upon the Governor's use of the transportation.
Aside from the Keating court's findings regarding statutory intent, the court's
analysis of the boundaries of authority between the legislature and Commission
warrants greater concern. The Oklahoma Supreme Court agreed that the rule is
applicable to the Governor when he is transported to a fundraising event.'
Consequently, in order for the court to invalidate the rule's effect upon the
Governor's transportation options, the court had to find that the Commission did not
have the authority to pass such a rule. The court determined that the Commission
cannot usurp the legislature's powers on issues such as transportation for a security
purpose, over which the Commission has no constitutional authority."
In Cullison, the court clearly distinguished the appropriate constitutional
boundaries between the Commission and the legislature. In Keating, however, the

(emphasis added).
121. See Ford v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 285 P.2d 436,437 (Okla. 1955).
122. 47 OKLA. STAT. § 2-101(b) (Supp. 1992).

123. See Karl Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons
About How Statutes Are to Be Construed,3 VAND. L. REv. 395, 401 (1950).

124. See Keating, 958 P.2d at 1257.
125.
126.
127.
128.

842 P.2d 750 (Okla. 1992).
See id. at 752.
See Keating, 958 P.2d at 1255.
See id. at 1261.
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court shifted the boundary away from its carefully placed constitutional moorings.
Recall that the court in Cullison found that the "obvious meaning" of the
constitutional amendment is that the people of Oklahoma intend for the ethical
conduct of state officials to be regulated by the Commission.' Yet, in the Keating
opinion, the court placed great weight on its conclusion that the legislature did not
intend for the Governor's DPS-provided transportation to have any ethical
limitations because the legislative statutes do not indicate any restrictions. But in
light of Cullison, the legislature has no authority to place ethical restrictions upon
the Governor's transportation. Therefore, in Keating, the court substantially
overstated the significance of the lack of expressed limitations. The people of
Oklahoma shifted the power to promulgate ethics rules to the Commission.
Unfortunately, the court continues to look to the legislature as the source for ethics
legislation. Not only is this against the court's precedent, but it also entices the
legislature to encroach upon the Commission's sole authority to promulgate ethical
rules of conduct.
The Keating decision also missed the constitutional mark on the issue of using
public funds for a partisan political purpose. The court erroneously distinguished
the Governor's use of state transportation as an activity that supports a public
purpose by way of comparing the Governor's use of state aircraft to attend
Republican Party fundraisers with the act of a law enforcement officer taking his
patrol car home at night." ° The comparison might as well be between the
President's use of Air Force One to that of an Army Private's use of his assigned
all-purpose vehicle. Certainly both vehicles are owned by the taxpayers and both
are needed for public purposes. But when an Army Private misuses his personally
assigned vehicle the potential negative impact to the taxpaying public is most likely
minimal. Perhaps the misuse could result in a tort claim for damages resulting from
reckless activity. When the President or a Governor misuses a state provided
vehicle for private political gain, the potential impact on the taxpaying public is the
outcome of a democratic election. Elections often turn on the amount of money
spent in a campaign. Free transportation to and from political events or parties,
which raise funds, provides an enormous advantage to the party or candidate
receiving the free ride. Such a substantial monetary shift in an election can easily
turn the result into a foregone conclusion and the voter's decision into an illusory
exercise of free will.
The court also placed too much importance upon the benefit to the public of the
Governor's ability to respond immediately to emergencies when he may be hundreds
of miles away from the Capital at a partisan political fundraiser. The court suggests
that the DPS-provided transportation is essential for the Governor to respond
quickly. The court seems to disregard the possibility that such a benefit could easily
be provided to the public through alternative measures that comport with the
Commission's Rule 257, 10-1-3. The Governor could utilize privately provided
transportation to attend the fundraisers. Simultaneously, the DPS could provide an

129. Ethics Comm'n v. Cullison, 850 P.2d 1069, 1076 (Okla. 1993).
130. See Keating, 958 P.2d at 1258.
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escort at all times that would be capable of immediately transporting the Governor
away from the event and to the emergency. In fact, the Governor is already
continuously provided with security escorts wherever he travels. Consequently, there
would be no additional cost to the taxpaying public for providing the escort.
The Governor argues that such a plan is "lacking in common sense" because it
requires the Governor to use private transportation when the DPS-provided security
transport is required to go anyway.' It is true that the plan requires two vehicles
to attend an event when only one vehicle could serve the purpose. But in either case
the taxpayers only foot the bill for one vehicle. The only additional expense is the
cost applied to the Governor due to his need for private transportation to attend the
partisan political event.
B. The Future of Oklahoma Ethics Law after Keating
Keating marks a significant setback in the Oklahoma voters' efforts to reclaim the
ethical high ground of their state government. The court's decision to place the
legislature's presumed intent over the express intent of the Ethics Commission may
serve over the long term to reduce the authority of the Commission. The
constitutional amendment that created the Commission established a carefully
designed method for promulgating and administering rules of ethical conduct. The
steps allowed for the legislature's involvement in the process of legislating ethics.
But the legislature's involvement was intended to be secondary to the Commission
on any issue concerning ethics. Unfortunately, Keating turns that vitally important
characteristic 180 degrees. Keating now holds that the Commission must take a
backseat to the legislature if the proposed ethics rule conflicts in any manner with
an existing statute, even if the existing statute in no way intended to address ethical
matters. Furthermore, the legislature may take little notice of its responsibility to
review newly promulgated Commission ethics rules. Keating demonstrates that the
courts will not interpret the legislature's inaction as an approval of the rule.
In regard to the specific controversy involved in Keating, the legislature recently
passed new legislation that now prohibits state officials, including the Governor,
from using state owned transportation to attend partisan political functions.' The
irony of the new legislation is that it focuses upon the ethics concerning the use of
state owned property for a partisan political purpose, which is the same issue
specifically dealt with in Keating and Rule 257, 10-1-3.
In Cullison, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the legislature cannot replace
rules set forth by the Commission with statutory provisions that regulate the ethical
conduct of state officials.' Now, only five years later, the legislature is forced
to violate the court's ruling in Cullisonin order to apply ethical standards on the use
of state owned transportation by the Governor and other state officials. Consequently, in light of Cullison the new statute should be overturned as unconstitutional.

131. See id. at 1261.
132. See 74 OKLA. STAT. § 500.6A (Supp. 1998).
133. See Cullison, 850 P.2d at 1075.
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Furthermore, the legislature's action now takes the specific issue of the Governor's
use of state provided transportation for partisan political events to the opposite
extreme. The practical solution to the specific controversy in Keating should be to
allow the Governor and other state officials to use their state provided transportation
to attend political fundraisers, and then require the official to compensate the state
treasury for the fair market value of the use of such transportation. Such solution
would level the political playing field and prevent an incumbent from simply taking
taxpayers for a free ride to a politically one-sided fundraiser, and a potentially onesided election.
On the federal level, such a plan already governs the President, whereby any
expenses incurred during campaigns are reimbursed, and expenses are pro-rated
when personal, political, and official appearances are intermingled."3 The
Oklahoma legislature could easily implement a similar statutory solution to
accommodate the Governor and other state officials.
VI. Conclusion
Simple legislation can solve the specific controversy in Keating concerning the
Governor and his transportation. However, the damage done to the authority and
power of the Ethics Commission may not be so readily remedied. The people of
Oklahoma took a large step by establishing a constitutionally empowered Ethics
Commission by way of initiative petition and state question. The mandate was clear
in creating an independent Commission provided with the necessary tools to
promulgate and enforce ethics rules. Unfortunately, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
has now placed the Commission in the perilous position of having to answer to the
Oklahoma Legislature and its lawmaking powers. Such an arrangement clearly
defies the intent of the amendment and the will of the people as set forth in article
29.
Sean Paul Rieger

134. See 5 C.AR. § 734.503 (1998) (defining method to reimburse United States Treasury for costs
associated with political activities); see also II C.F.R. § 9034.7 (1998) (defining methods to determine
allocation of travel expenditures).
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